ICPS Newsletter. 196 (July 14)
Grain crisis could have been avoided by -
# 196, 14 July 2003
ICPS newsletter
A publication of the International Centre for Policy Studies
The first signs of a crisis in the food grain
market appeared at the end of March 2003.
Domestic wheat supply fell substantially
and trigerred price growth almost doubling
that during the harvesting period of 2002.
The 2002 grain crop was reported at 38.8
million tons, with average domestic
consumption being 25–26 million tons a
year and the rest of the grain available for
export. However, already after 10.27
million tons of grain had been exported by
the end of Q1'03, the food grain market
began to show signs of a deficit. In our
opinion, this situation was caused by:
• negative expectations of grain producers
concerning the 2003 harvest, the necessity
to resow substantial areas, and the late
sowing campaign due to unfavourable
weather conditions that restrained
producers from selling grain;
• substantial growth particularly in the
export of food grain in MY'02/03;
• overstatement of grain production by
individual enterprises and officials and, as
a result, inflated data on the 2002 harvest.
We believe that the shortage in the grain
market could have been avoided if there
had been an effective government policy in
the sector. Given the ineffectiveness of
stabilising mechanisms, farmers have no
alternatives but to export the grain, as not
all of them have access to grain elevators1.
The following areas of government policy
require adjustment:
• introduction of mechanisms for internal
stabilisation of the grain supply and prices
for it (pledged and intervention
procurements); 
• discontinuation of the binding of loan
interest refunds to the budget year, as the
necessity to repay loans before the end of the
year pressures farmers to sell their grain at a
disadvantageous time, when prices are low;
• development of forward and futures
trading in grain; 
• expansion of farmers' access to grain
elevators, particularly those belonging to
the Khlib Ukrainy SJSC (40 elevators,
including 2 harbour ones), by means of
restructuring the latter;
• reforming the State Reserve and
strengthening control over the activity of
officials with access to reserved grain and
exercising its procurement.
At the same time, we do not believe the
intensification of administrative
interference in the grain market to be
advisable (increasing the number of check=
ups, prohibiting inter=oblast trade). Such
measures would increase the risks of grain
growing and bring down the investment
attractiveness of the sector.
Proper government policy 
will prevent further crises 
Sharp increases in the price of flour and
cereals in the last ten days of June 2003,
caused by market player scheming and a rush
on the part of the population, led to social
welfare losses. Authorities made active
attempts to stabilise the markets, mainly by
means of administrative=organisational
measures. Yet the lack of a long=term
strategy for stabilisation cannot help the
Ukrainian government to avoid substantial
seasonal instability of prices. The negative
outcomes of such instability are:
• high risks of investment and reduction of
investment recoupment margins, which
lowers incentives to invest;
• redistribution of revenues among
creditors and debtors;
• increased risks of making mistakes during
pricing, as it is not known whether
instability of prices is a trend or just a
temporary factor.
Key reasons behind the price fluctuations
include the following: 
• fragmentary and incomplete information.
The lack of information about stocks of grain,
flour, and cereals, as well as the absence of
proper expectations with regard to prices on
them have led to losses for market players;
households react to temporary deficits, while
trading enterprises lose potential long=term
profits because of the shortage of
information about what is in demand; 
• ineffective market functioning. Market
infrastructure, which should act as a
mechanism for price=setting and forming
expectations, hardly works or is
nonexistent (no exchange or futures
operations, etc.). The dearth of information
results in a retarded reaction to changes in
demand, because of the lack of operative
stocks of commodities at both private
operators and the government, the latter of
which is thus unable to resort to
interventions in cases of market
mechanism failure (which it should do); 
• the absence of a consistent long=term
government policy of market stabilisation,
and a delayed reaction to market failures; 
• one=sidedness of non=market methods of
influencing the market. 
We believe that the government has to
work out a single approach to market
regulation with a clear seasonal cycle: 
• promoting competition, de=
monopolisation, and prevention of
conspiracy;
• development of infrastructure and
making information more transparent; 
• increased spending on short=term
interventions that may cut long=term
losses due to market instability.
The peak of the grain crisis in Ukraine has passed, along with the period of
agitated demand, and prices in the wholesale wheat market are gradually
coming down. Finally, the following questions remain: what caused the crisis,
could it have been avoided in time, and what government strategy is needed not
to create conditions for further crises?
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1 According to the data of АPК=Inform from 
15 May 2003, only 30% of grain producers are
able to store grain for 3–4 months. Over 60%
of producers sell grain straight off the field. 
We wish you a pleasant vacation!
The ICPS Newsletter team will take a
vacation break, and wishes all its readers a
good summer. See you in September!
